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Abstract—An empirical investigation of active/continuous au-
thentication for smartphones is presented in this paper by
exploiting users’ unique application usage data, i.e., distinct
patterns of use, modeled by a Markovian process. Variations of
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are evaluated for continuous
user verification, and challenges due to the sparsity of session-
wise data, an explosion of states, and handling unforeseen events
in the test data are tackled. Unlike traditional approaches, the
proposed formulation does not depend on the top N-apps, rather
uses the complete app-usage information to achieve low latency.
Through experimentation, empirical assessment of the impact
of unforeseen events, i.e., unknown applications and unforeseen
observations, on user verification is done via a modified edit-
distance algorithm for simple sequence matching. It is found
that for enhanced verification performance, unforeseen events
should be incorporated in the models by adopting smoothing
techniques with HMMs. For validation, extensive experiments
on two distinct datasets are performed. The marginal smoothing
technique is the most effective for user verification in terms of
equal error rate (EER) and with a sampling rate of 1/30s−1
and 30 minutes of historical data, and the method is capable of
detecting an intrusion within ∼ 2.5 minutes of application use.
Keywords—Active authentication; application usage-based ver-
ification; unforeseen observation handling; hidden markov mod-
els; marginal smoothing; markov chains; sequence matching;
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid increase of smartphone users worldwide, the
mobile applications are growing both in number and popularity
[38]. The number of apps in Google Play store is around
8 million, while in Apple App Store, Windows Store and
Amazon Appstore there around 2.2 million, 669 thousand,
and 600 thousand applications, respectively1. It has been
estimated that a total of 197 billion mobile application were
downloaded in 20172. A retrospective study in 2016 showed
that on average a smartphone user uses over 30 different
mobile applications per month and ∼ 10 different applications
per day [1]. As for usage duration in 2016, in the USA, the
smartphone users spend on a daily basis over two hours on
mobile applications, i.e., over a month usage of applications
in a year [1]. With growing concerns of smartphone security,
monitoring the application usage coupled with the diverse
1https://www.statista.com/statistics/276623/number-of-apps-available-in-
leading-app-stores/
2https://www.statista.com/statistics/271644/worldwide-free-and-paid-
mobile-app-store-downloads/
pool of applications can help to make a difference in user
authentication systems.
Smartphone application usage data can provide several
interesting insights on the device users leading to different
use cases of such data. There are several research works on
user profiling and predicting behavioral patterns using applica-
tion usage data [39][38][34][37]. Predicting application usage
pattern can also help optimizing smartphone resources and
help simulating realistic usage data for automated smartphone
testing [20][15][18][8][16][4]. The open foreground applica-
tion can also work as a context for active authentication using
other modalities [7][17][26][27]. For example, when verifying
with touch and accelerometer data, the application running
in the background can provide useful context for robust
authentication. Intuitively, the way a user handles and swipes
in a phone for a banking application is very different from
those for a gaming application. The foreground application
context can be even more useful for active authentication
if some more insightful information about the applications
are available as metadata. For example, one key idea of ac-
tive/continuous authentication is gradually blocking a probable
intruder starting from the most sensitive applications, such as
banking and social media accounts [31] [23]. If the sensitivity
level or the type of application is known as metadata, it
would be possible to attain enhanced security. Also, some
applications, if permitted, can access the location data and
store click information for targeted advertisement and similar
applications [21]. A more active use case of application-usage
data could be verifying the users solely from the pattern of
usage. The different use cases of app-usage data are shown in
Fig. 1.
In this paper, the suitability of application-usage data as
a modality for smartphone user verification is thoroughly
investigated. The main contributions of this paper are:
• An innovative formulation that utilizes application usage
data pattern as a biometric for user verification. The
formulation tackles key challenges such as data sparsity
and accounting for unforeseen test observations. Unlike
traditional approaches of using top N-applications for
authentication purposes [11], in the proposed formulation
the full list of applications are considered for verification
models in order to ensure low-latency which is essential
for active authentication systems.
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Fig. 1. Use cases for smartphone app-usage data.
• Insight into the application usage similarity among dif-
ferent users and statistics on unforeseen applications.
• A thorough investigation of the impact of unknown ap-
plications and unforeseen observations on the verification
task.
• A Modified Edit-Distance (M-ED) algorithm and ex-
periments to demonstrate the advantage of including
unforeseen events during sequence matching.
• Modeling the Person Authentication using Trace Histories
(PATH) problem as a variation of the person authentica-
tion using location histories [22].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, background
and related works on this topic are discussed. In Section
III, the approach is explained in detail along with associated
challenges and possible solutions. The impact of unknown
application and unforeseen events is investigated in Section
IV, and several methods for handling the active authentication
problem effectively are described in Section V. Finally, a
detailed analysis on the application usage data, experimental
results and discussions are presented in Section VI, followed
by conclusions and suggestions for future work in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, some of the most recent published literature
on active authentication and the utilization of application usage
data are reviewed. The section also discusses the exploitation
of two active authentication datasets (UMDAA-02 [23] and
Securacy [9]) for this research work.
A. Active/Continuous Authentication of Smartphones
Active, continuous or implicit authentication are different
terminologies for the same authentication approach in which
the rightful user of mobile devices is authenticated throughout
the entire session of usage [13][29][23]. In recent years, active
authentication research has gained a lot of attention because
of the increased security risks and complexity of password,
token-based, multi-factor and other explicit authentication
systems [29]. In active authentication, the wide range of
sensor data available on the mobile devices are utilized to
learn one or more templates for the legitimate user during a
training session. The templates are used in the background
to continuously authenticate the user during regular usage
and based on the amount of deviation from the templates
the device itself starts restricting access to phone applications
and utilities starting from the most sensitive ones [23]. Most
popular modalities for active authentication are front camera
face images [32][14][5], touch screen gesture data[10][6][40],
accelerometer and gyroscope data [12][30][28], location data
[22] etc. Suitability of different behavioral biometric such as
touch and keystroke dynamics, phone pick-up patterns, gait
dynamic, and patterns from location trace history have been
explored for active authentication[25][19][22]. Combinations
of multiple biometric have been demonstrated to produce
robust authentication on real-life data3.
B. Prior Research on Application-Usage Data
In recent years, there has been a lot of focus on predicting
individual and community-wise application usage patterns
[2]. For example, in [38], the authors investigate the ratio
of local and global applications in the top usage list, the
traffic pattern for different application categories, likelihood
of co-occurrence of two different applications and such other
patterns in usage. In this work, the authors identify traffic
from distinct applications using HTTP signatures. On the other
hand, in [35] the authors use mobile in-app advertisements
to identify the applications in network traces. Using the ad
flow data, the authors tried to analyze the usage behavior of
different types of applications. In [39], the authors analyzed
the application-usage logs of over 4, 000 smartphone users
worldwide to develop an app-usage prediction model that
leverages user preferences, historical usage patterns, activities
and shared aggregate patterns of application behavior.
From the authentication front, in [17], the authors proposed
an application centric decision approach for active or implicit
authentication in which applications are used as context to
decide what modalities to use to authenticate a user and
when to do it. Application usage data has also been used to
generate scores for user authentication in [11]. The authors
only considered the frequency of occurrence of an application
in the training set to determine the likelihood of being a
particular user, missing the temporal variation in the the usage
pattern.
An interesting use-case of application-usage data is pre-
sented in [33]. The authors used a large-scale annotated
application-usage dataset to build a predictor that can estimate
where a person is (e.g., at home or office) and if he/she is
with a close friend or a family member. In [20], the authors
used application usage traces along with system status and
sensor indicators to predict the battery life of the phones using
machine learning techniques.
3http://www.biometricupdate.com/201506/atap-division-head-previews-
behavioral-biometrics-system-at-google-io
TABLE I
GENERAL INFORMATION ON APPLICATION-USAGE DATA AVAILABLE IN
THE UMDAA-02 DATASET.
No. of Subjects with ≥ 500 training samples and
≥ 200 test samples for sampling rate of 1/30s−1
(Train/Test)
32/26
Avg. No. of Sessions/User with App-Usage Data of
the 26 selected subjects (train/test)
∼ 582/ ∼ 197
Train/Test split for the experiment 70%/30%
Total Number of Unique Applications Used by the
26 selected subjects (train/test)
119/67
Average Number of Samples Per User for the 26
selected subjects (train/test)
∼ 4307/ ∼ 1399
C. Datasets on Application Usage
Even though there have been diverse research approaches
that need application-usage data, there is a scarcity of pub-
licly available datasets. Also, many of the application-usage
datasets have limited number of applications or are not un-
bounded real-life usage data, but instead contain data gener-
ated under supervision or by following certain instructions.
In this work, all the experiments are performed on two well-
known large scale public datasets suitable for investigating the
active authentication problem, namely, the application-usage
data of University of Maryland Active Authentication Dataset-
02 (UMDAA-02)4 [24] and the Securacy 5 [9] dataset from
the Center of Ubiquitous Computing, University of Oulu.
1) UMDAA-02 Application-Usage Dataset: The UMDAA-
02 dataset is specifically designed for evaluating active au-
thentication systems in the wild. The dataset consists of
141.14 GB of smartphone sensor data collected from 45
volunteers who were using Nexus 5 phones in their regular
daily activities over a period of two months. The data col-
lection application ran completely in the background and the
collected data includes the front-facing camera, touchscreen,
gyroscope, accelerometer, magnetometer, light sensor, GPS,
Bluetooth, WiFi, proximity sensor, temperature sensor and
pressure sensor among with the timing of screen unlock and
lock events, start and end timestamps of calls and currently
running foreground application, etc. The application usage
data from 45 users is summarized in Table I. However, not
all the users have adequate amount of usage data. For all the
experiments in this paper, a total of 26 users are used who
has more that 500 training samples and more than 200 test
samples for any sampling rate between 1/5s−1 to 1/30s−1.
The usage statistics for the top 20 applications for the selected
26 subjects is presented in Table II. The usage rate for the top
20 applications for each user is shown in fig. 2(a). From the
table and the figure, it is readily seen that the applications
ranked 6th, 8th, 12th and 20th are in the top list because of
excessive usage by very few users, where as, the remaining
applications are genuinely popular among the users.
2) Securacy Application Usage Dataset: The Securacy
dataset was originally created within the context of exploring
4Available at https://umdaa02.github.io/
5Available at http://ubicomp.oulu.fi/securacy-understanding-mobile-
privacy-and-security-concerns/
TABLE II
APP-USAGE STATISTICS FOR THE TOP 20 APPS FOR THE 26 SELECTED
USERS OF THE UMDAA-02 DATASET.
Rank App Name No.
of
Users
Per User
Usage
Overall
Usage
1 com.google.android.
googlequicksearchbox
26 283.27 283.27
2 com.android.dialer 25 255.24 245.42
3 com.whatsapp 15 303.6 175.15
4 com.android.chrome 26 141.42 141.42
5 com.facebook.katana 11 308.18 130.38
6 com.nextwave.wcc2 1 2366 91
7 com.google.android.youtube 16 144.38 88.85
8 com.ea.game.pvzfree 2 872.5 67.12
9 com.google.android.gm 24 51.04 47.12
10 com.android.mms 22 52.09 44.08
11 com.google.android.talk 18 62.28 43.12
12 com.andrewshu.android.reddit 1 842 32.38
13 com.nextbus.mobile 19 41.89 30.62
14 com.google.android.apps.docs 24 33 30.46
15 com.android.settings 24 27.71 25.58
16 com.google.android.apps.maps 14 44 23.69
17 com.android.camera2 22 20.5 17.35
18 com.google.android.gallery3d 17 24.94 16.31
19 com.android.vending 21 20.1 16.23
20 com.viber.voip 5 74.6 14.35
the privacy and security concerns of a smartphone user by
analyzing the location of servers that different applications use
and whether secure network connections are used. For a period
of approximately six months, the data was collected from 218
anonymous participants who installed the data collection appli-
cation from the Google Play store. The collected data, 679.90
GB, includes the currently running foreground application,
installed, removed or updated applications, application server
connections and device location, etc. Out of the 218 users of
the original Securacy dataset, 99 are used for this experiment
based on the limits on training and test observations as
mentioned for the UMDAA-02 dataset. The application usage
data for the 99 subjects in the Securacy dataset are summarized
in Table III and the corresponding usage statistics for the
top 20 applications are presented in Table IV. The usage
rate for the top 20 applications for each user are show in
fig. 2(b). Note that the top applications ranked 1st, 2nd and
4th in Table IV are actually the same application written in
Spanish, English and Finnish, respectively. Similarly, rank 12,
‘Horloge’ is ’Clock’ in French, and therefore is the same
application as rank 19. However, these applications are shown
separately here because, for the active authentication problem,
even the preferred language of the user is a type of biometric
metadata and can be used to discriminate between users.
Also, similar to UMDAA-02 dataset usage statistics, there
are several applications in the top 20 rank that were actually
used by only a few users very frequently (ranked 1, 4, 9, 12,
16). For this dataset, this phenomenon can be attributed to
language difference as well because if the language difference
were nullified, then rank 1, 2, 4 will collapse at rank 1 and
rank 12 and 19 will collapse at 12 - thereby removing three
applications from the list (rank 1, 4 and 12) that has very
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Similarity matrix depicting top 20 application-usage rate among users in the training set of the (a) UMDAA-02 dataset and, (b) Securacy dataset.
TABLE III
GENERAL INFORMATION ON APPLICATION-USAGE DATA AVAILABLE IN
THE SECURACY DATASET.
No. of Subjects with ≥ 500 training samples and
≥ 200 test samples for sampling rate of 1/30s−1
(Train/Test)
201/99
Avg. No. of Sessions/User with App-Usage Data of
the 26 selected subjects (train/test)
∼ 119/ ∼ 96
Train/Test split for the experiment 70%/30%
Total Number of Unique Applications Used by the
26 selected subjects (train/test)
1340/554
Average Number of Samples Per User for the 26
selected subjects (train/test)
∼ 2235/ ∼ 1745
few users. For the user verification research presented here,
the language variation is kept unaltered in order to retain the
naturalness of the dataset and the algorithms are expected to
learn to discriminate between users based on the language as
well as on usage pattern.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The application usage data from smartphones coupled with
the timing information can be used to determine the exact day
time and duration of using any application. It is assumed here
that there might be certain pattern in the usage of different
applications at different time of the day or during weekdays
and weekends. Hence, a state-space model can be intuitively
considered for modeling the pattern of application usage for
a particular user. Models for different users are assumed to
be different because of the difference in lifestyle of each
individual. Therefore, the state-space model of a user can
effectively be considered as a model for the pattern of life
of that user and can be used to differentiate the user from
others. There are however several challenges to this approach
towards solving the authentication problem using application
usage:
• Forming observation states from the application data and
corresponding timing information.
TABLE IV
APP-USAGE STATISTICS FOR THE TOP 20 APPS FOR THE 99 SELECTED
USERS OF THE SECURACY DATASET.
Rank App Name No.
of
Users
Per User
Usage
Overall
Usage
1 Sistema Android 4 9972.25 402.92
2 Android System 80 480.44 388.23
3 com.android.keyguard 34 802.79 275.71
4 Android-jrjestelm 5 4820.8 243.47
5 System UI 80 242 195.56
6 Nova Launcher 19 794.79 152.54
7 Maps 38 363.08 139.36
8 Google Search 53 214.3 114.73
9 Launcher 12 650 78.79
10 Chrome 60 128.2 77.7
11 Facebook 49 154.53 76.48
12 Horloge 1 7328 74.02
13 YouTube 49 144.94 71.74
14 TouchWiz home 20 348.3 70.36
15 Securacy 84 75.39 63.97
16 Internet 16 371.25 60
17 WhatsApp 37 154.62 57.79
18 Google Play Store 72 71.83 52.24
19 Clock 44 113.89 50.62
20 Package installer 36 138.69 50.43
• Training a state-space model in a way that it can handle
unforeseen observations during testing.
• Generating verification scores from sequential observa-
tion data.
Each of these challenges and the proposed solutions are
discussed here.
A. Application Names to Observation States
Incorporating the temporal information with the application
name is a challenge because the user can use an application
at any time, and therefore power set of all applications
and all probable time is intractable even if we sample at
a relatively high frequency. For example, if there are N
number of applications and if we sample every 5 minutes,
then there would be 480 unique time stamps in a day and 3360
timestamps in a week. This would mean a total of 3360×N
observation states for the applications in a week. However,
for a single application, most of these observation states will
either not occur or occur very infrequently in the training set.
Hence, training a reliable state-space models with this sparsely
occurring observation states will be difficult.
In this regard, the time-zone and weekday/weekend flag
idea are adopted from [22]. By dividing the day into three
distinct time zones (TZs), namely, TZ1 (12:01 am to 8:00
am), TZ2 (8:01 am to 4:00 pm) and TZ3 (4:01 pm to 12:00
pm), and denoting weekday/weekend with a flag W (t) ∈
WD,WE∀t, respectively, the total number of possible ob-
servation states is kept limited to 6N . The functions TZ(t)
and W (t) maps any time t into one of the corresponding
timezone and weekday/weekend, respectively. The impact of
converting application tags into observations on verifying the
users of the UMDAA-02 app-usage data and the Securacy
datasets can be visualized from Figs. 3(a)-(b) and 3(c)-(d),
respectively. The similarity matrix in Figs. 3(a) depicts the
percentage of common applications between two users in
UMDAA-02 training dataset, whereas, the similarity matrix
in Fig. 3(b) depicts the percentage of common observations
between any two users on the same dataset. It is clear that
the similarity of observations between two different users is
less than the similarity of applications. The effect is less
visible on the Securacy dataset (Figs. 3(c)-(d))because the
subjects came from a diverse population than the subjects of
the UMDAA-02 dataset. Hence, the similarity of applications
is less pronounced, yet, the differences between application
similarity and observation similarity are still present.
B. Taking Unknown Applications into Account
Now, in order to handle unknown applications that might
be present in the test set, an additional application name U
is considered. The U application adds 6 observation states
when combined with TZs and W . Note that in the training set
there is no probability of having any U application, and all the
observations with U are assigned a very small prior probability
(10e − 20) when state-space models are trained. Also, it is
ensured for state-space models that the emission probability
for the states with U application does not go to zero, in
order to prevent zero probability score during testing when
unknown applications are encountered. If the total number of
unique applications used by user X in the training set is Ax,
then any application αy of the test user Y in the test set
A¯y will be denoted as U if αy /∈ Ax. In [22], the authors
addressed similar issues for geo-location data by considering
even more additional states such as nearby unknowns. How-
ever, proximity is a vague concept for application data and
therefore only U is considered here. Note that, any observation
with an unknown application is unforeseen by default, but an
unforeseen observation with some other application name is
not unknown.
Note that, apart from U , unforeseen observations might be
present in the test set. For example, in the training set an
application αx might only occur in weekdays at timezones
TZ1 and TZ2 while the same application might be used in
the test set at time zone TZ3 on a weekday. In that case, the
test observation (αx, TZ3,WD) would be unforeseen in the
training set. For state space models, this problem is handled by
generating all possible combinations applications, time zone
and day flag and use them to construct the model. If one such
observation is not present in the training set, it is assigned
non-zero prior and emission probabilities to ensure that they
do not bring down the probability of a test sequence to zero.
C. Handling Uncertainty
Now that unknown applications and unforeseen observation
states are addressed, we tackle the creation of observation
states via binning of time-stamped data. In most cases, the
data collection is done in sessions, where a session starts
with unlocking the phone and stops when the phone is locked
again. Even if this is not the case, there can be very long idle
times between consecutive usage of a phone, during which,
authentication is a redundant operation and no application is
running in the foreground [36]. Hence, there can be a big gap
between the start-time for an application and the stop time of
the previous application in the data log. This time gap might
be as small as several seconds to as big as several days even
for a user who owns a smartphone for regular use [3]. The
sparsity introduced by this time gap is handled in two ways.
At the beginning of each session (unlocking of the phone)
a dummy observation state Ψ is introduced. The state-space
model is expected to learn that Ψ is a time gap which might
or might not cause a change in the time zone. For example,
the last used application might be in TZ1 before the closing
of a session. Then the next session may occur in either TZ1
or TZ2 or TZ3 of the same day. If the next session is in the
next day or if the day changes within a running session, then
an additional flag ∆ is introduced which denotes the transition
into next day. The time zone and weekday/weekend flags are
ignored for observations Ψ and ∆.
So, taking the six probable observations for U and the Ψ and
∆ observations into consideration, the total number of possible
observation states for user X would be 6N + 6U + Ψ + ∆.
D. System Overview
A diagram depicting an application-usage-based user ver-
ification system is shown in Fig. 4. Once the observation
sequence is extracted, a verification model can be trained
based on the patterns in the sequence. The verification model
can be a state space model, a string matching approach or
even a recurrent neural network, depending on data availability
and need. For state-space models, once training for a user is
done, the model can be used to generate scores for last n test
observation sequences created using the same protocol that
was used during the training phase. The score can be thresh-
olded to obtain the verification decision. For more simpler
methods such as sequence matching, unknown applications
and unforeseen observations are difficult to handle. For the
authentication problem, the unknown and unforeseen play key
roles, described in the next section.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3. Similarity matrix depicting (a) application name overlap, and (b) observations overlap for the training set of the UMDAA-02 dataset. Similarly, (c)
and (d) depicts the application overlap and observations overlap for the training set of the Securacy dataset
IV. THE ROLE OF UNKNOWN APPLICATION AND
UNFORESEEN OBSERVATIONS IN USER VERIFICATION
A. Statistics of unknown applications in the test data
If an application is present in the test set but not encountered
in the training set, the application is denoted with U as
unknown application in the proposed formulation. Intuitively,
the prevalence of U will be much higher if the test set comes
from a different user or from an intruder of the phone, while
for the legitimate user the test set will have fewer unknown
applications. This intuition is verified on the application usage
data from both UMDAA-02 and Securacy datasets, as can be
seen from the box plots in Fig. 5.
Note that the gap between the whisker plots for same
user and different users is larger for the Securacy dataset
in comparison to UMDAA-02 dataset. Securacy is a larger
dataset with more users, more data per user and more variation
in user demographies compared to UMDAA-02 in which the
subjects were from a narrow age range and were all affiliated
with the same institution. Hence, it shows that among the
general population, even the selection of applications varies
widely between users.
B. Impacts of binary decision based on unforeseen events
Two simple experiments with unknown applications U and
unforeseen observations are performed on the UMDAA-02 and
Securacy datasets to evaluate their role in user verification.
The observations for each user are chronologically sorted and
the earliest 70% observations are considered for training and
the rest for testing. Now, for any user i in the training set, a
sequence of training observations Stri is obtained along with
the set of unique applications Ai. Now, each test sequence of
a user is compared with the training sequence and application
lists of the training subjects and different binary hard decision
Fig. 4. Overview of an application-usage-based user verification system for mobile devices.
rules are applied in two experiments. In the first experiment,
the binary decision rule is based on occurrence of an appli-
cation in the test set that is not present in the training set.
In the second experiment, the decision is taken based on the
occurrence of an unforeseen observation in the test set. In
both cases, if there is even a single occurrence of an unknown
application or an unforeseen observation, then the match score
is set to 0.0, otherwise it is set to 1.0. The matching algorithms
for the two experiments are shown in (1) and (2), respectively.
The data sampling rates for both these experiments were set
to 1/30 per second, which resulted in ∼ 16863 training-test
sequence pairs for the UMDAA-02 application-usage dataset
and ∼ 846331 training-test sequence pairs for the Securacy
dataset. The number of users with adequate training and test
data is 26 in UMDAA-02 and 99 in Securacy, leading to an
average of ∼ 647 and ∼ 8549 pairs per user, respectively.
Algorithm 1 Binary Decision Rule based on Unknown Ap-
plications
procedure BINUNK(Ai, Stej ) . List of unique applications
of user i (Ai), n-last Test Sequence Vector of user j (Stej )
for vte ∈ Stej do . Loop through all test observations
ate ← vte[0] . Get the application name from the
test observation
if ate /∈ Ai then
return 0.0 . Return score 0.0 if any unknown
application is encountered
end if
end for
return 1.0 . Return score 1.0 if no unknown
application in test sequence
end procedure
Algorithm 2 Binary Decision Rule based on Unforeseen
Observations
procedure BINUNFORE(Stri , Stej ) . Sequence of
training observations for user i (Stri ), n-last Test Sequence
Vector of user j (Stej )
for vte ∈ Stej do . Loop through all test observations
if vte /∈ Stri then
return 0.0 . Return score 0.0 if any unforeseen
observation is encountered
end if
end for
return 1.0 . Return score 1.0 if no unforeseen
observation in test sequence
end procedure
Results for several evaluation metrics namely, sensitivity,
specificity, F1-score and accuracy - all in percentage, obtained
through the two experiments on the two datasets are shown in
Fig. 6(a)-(d). The definition of these metrics are as follows:
Sensitivity =
TP
TP + FN
× 100% (1)
Specificity =
TN
TN + FP
× 100% (2)
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN
× 100% (3)
F1− Score = 2TP
2TP + FP + FN
× 100% (4)
where, TP , FP and FN are the numbers of true positive,
false positive and false negative detections, respectively. High
Sensitivity implies smaller number of false-negatives, while
high Specificity implies less false-positives. Accuracy over
50% denotes that the true values outweighs the false predic-
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. Boxplots depicting the percentage of unknown application in test data for (a) UMDAA-02 dataset, and (b) Securacy dataset, for different sampling
rates. Note that the average percentage of unknown applications used by the the different user is much bigger than that for same user on both datasets.
tions. Finally, F1-Score implies better overall precision and
recall.
Fig. 6 gives the following interesting insights about the im-
pact of the unknown applications and unforeseen observations
on the performance metrics for the two datasets.
• With increasing sequence length n, the specificity is
increasing gradually for all the cases, while sensitivity is
decreasing. The decrease in sensitivity is probably due to
the fact that the probability of having an unknown appli-
cation in the sequence increases with increasing sequence
size, thereby increasing the chances for false negatives.
On the other hand, with increasing n more sequences are
denoted as negatives, which in effect reduces the number
of false positives and therefore increases specificity.
• The sensitivity drops drastically when unforeseen ob-
servations are used instead of unknown applications as
decision criteria. This is understandable, since the number
of false negatives increases rapidly when all sequences
with at least on unforeseen observations are marked as
data from a different user.
• The number of false positives decreases when unfore-
seen observations are considered for decision instead of
unknowns. This leads to a jump in specificity for a fixed
n. In general, the specificity is much higher for Securacy
dataset in comparison to UMDAA-02. This proves that
there are more unknown applications and unforeseen
applications in Securacy when comparing a user with
others. Securacy being a more diverse and larger dataset
has wider variation of information, which leads to this
phenomenon. Here, the training data for each user is
Fig. 6. (a) Sensitivity, (b) Specificity, (c) F1-Score, and (d) Accuracy (in %) obtained by varying sequence length n for Securacy and UMDAA-02 application-
usage data for using the Binary Hard Decision rule based on unknown applications and unforeseen observations.
longer, meaning that they are much closer representation
of real life and therefore, an unknown application or
unforeseen observation is actually a different user’s data
in most cases.
• Higher sensitivity, however, does not mean that for real
life data a simple binary classifier based on unforeseen
observations is reasonably good. The F1-Score is very
low for both datasets, which means either precision
or recall or both of therm are very low. Since in the
active authentication using application usage, the number
of positive pairs is largely outweighed by the number
of negative pairs, it can be assumed that FP >>
FN and TN >> TP . Since Precision= TPTP+FP and
Recall= TPTP+FN , that means, Recall>Precision. With in-
creasing n, FN increases, while FP decreases, leading
to reduction in recall and increase in precision. However,
given the fact that the F1-Score does not improve much
with increasing n, it can be assumed that Recall reduces
steeply while Precision does not improve much.
• Irrespective of deciding with unknown or unforeseen, the
accuracy is always lower for the UMDAA-02 dataset
in comparison to Securacy dataset. Even though the
application-usage information in Securacy is much larger
than UMDAA-02, probably due to the high demograph-
ical similarity among the subjects of UMDAA-02, the
binary hard measure performs poorly in comparison to
Securacy. In practice, there could not be any assumption
made about the demographic similarity or dissimilarity of
an user and an intruder - hence, using neither unknown
applications nor unforeseen observations as a hard deci-
sion metric cannot be a practical solution to the active
authentication problem.
• The experiment once again proves that ’accuracy’ is not
a good performance metric when the number of samples
between classes is severely biased. In this example, the
average percentage of positive pairs in the dataset is
∼ 3.85% on UMDAA-02 dataset and ∼ 1.01% in the
Securacy dataset. Being an open set problem, the task is
to deal with heavily biased data towards negative samples
and better performance measures in this regard would be
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves and equal
error rates (EER) instead of accuracy.
C. Impacts of ignoring unforeseen events
Now that the impact of unforeseen events on the authen-
tication problem are established, a slightly more advanced
sequence matching approach based on Levenshtein Distance
a.k.a Edit-Distance (ED) is performed to study the impact
of ignoring the unknown observations and unforeseen events.
When matching sequence s1 to another sequence s2 of the
same length, the original ED calculates the number of dele-
tions, insertions, or substitutions required to transform s1 to
s2. For the active authentication problem, let’s assume that a
test observation sequence Ste of length n is to be matched
with any training observation sequence Str of length N ,
where, intuitively N > n. Since each observation consists
of an application name, timezone and day flag, when a
mismatch occurs, the distance can be assumed to be different
depending on the amount of match. For example, if only the
application name matches, then the timezone and day flag
needs to be substituted, leading to two operations. Based on
this fact, the a modified algorithm for edit distance (M-ED) is
presented in (3). Using this algorithm, three different tests are
performed on the UMDAA-02 dataset, the results for which
Algorithm 3 Pseudocode for the modified edit-Distance algorithm.
procedure M-ED(Str, Ste). Training observation sequence of a user (Str) of length N , n-last Test observation Sequence
of any user (Ste), where length(Str)> n.
D ← [1, 2, . . . , n]
for j = 0 to n− 1 do
d← zeros[1 : n]
d[0]← [j + 1]
for i = 0 to length(Str − 1) do
if Ste[j] == Str[i] then
d[i+ 1]← D[i] . Exact match, no operation needed.
else
A1, T1,W1 ← Str[i] . Extract application name, timezone and day flag from the observations.
A2, T2,W2 ← Ste[j] . Extract application name, timezone and day flag from the observations.
NOp ← 0
if A1 == A2 and (T1 == T2 or W1 == W2) then
NOp ← 1 . One substitution needed if only timezone or day does not match.
else if A1 == A2 then
NOp ← 2 . Two substitution needed if neither timezone nor day are matching.
else
NOp ← 3 . Three substitution operation for no match.
end if
d[i+ 1]← NOp+ min(D[i], D[i+ 1], d[i− 1])
end if
D ← d
end for
end for
return D[n− 1]
end procedure
are given in Table V. In the first test, all test observations are
included, while in the next two tests, the observations with
unknown applications, and the unforeseen observations are
ignored. In order to ignore the unforeseen observations, for any
training sequence, each test sequence is compared to find the
unforeseen observations and removed from the test sequence.
For unknown applications, the corresponding observation is
removed. This operation reduced the number of samples per
user from 891 to 458 and 245, respectively, and the number of
unique application in the test data went from 61 to 60 and 45.
As can be seen from Table V, the lowest EERs for any value of
n are obtained when all observations are considered. Ignoring
both unknown applications and unforeseen observations make
the verification task difficult. Also, for practical purposes,
ignoring samples will cause latency in decision making, which
can greatly reduce the recall of an active authentication system.
In the next section, some suitable modeling approaches for
the application usage-based active authentication problem are
discussed.
V. SUITABLE MODELING TECHNIQUES
In light of the outcomes of the experiments presented in
the previous section, it can be asserted that the application-
usage-based verification models must be capable of taking into
account unknown applications and unforeseen observations.
A popular approach to model temporal data sequences is
TABLE V
PERFORMANCE OF THE M-ED ALGORITHM IN TERMS OF EER (%) FOR
THREE TYPES OF TEST SEQUENCES - ALL OBSERVATIONS, ALL EXCEPT
THE ONES WITH UNKNOWN APPLICATIONS AND ALL WITHOUT
UNFORESEEN OBSERVATIONS. EXPERIMENT PERFORMED ON THE
UMDAA-02 DATASET WITH FIXED SAMPLING RATE AT 1/30s−1 .
n
%EER
All Obs. No Unknown Apps. No Unforeseen Obs.
20 43.20 49.22 48.96
30 39.03 44.72 46.70
40 36.97 43.64 45.01
50 35.53 42.19 44.16
60 34.31 42.47 43.29
to use state-space models such as Mobility Markov Chains
or Hidden Markov Models (HMM) which can model time
variation of the data. However, these methods are not capable
of handling unforeseen events by default. For example, any
unforeseen event will be given a zero emission probability
in these models, and therefore, the models will be somewhat
like the binary decision model that was discussed earlier.
However, simple modifications to these models can improve
the usability of these methods when unforeseen events are
present as discussed in [22] for geo-location data. In this paper,
the three state-space models namely, the Markov Chain (MC)-
based Verification, HMM with Laplacian Smoothing (HMM-
lap) and Marginally Smoothed HMM (MSHMM), described in
[22] are employed on the application-usage-based verification
task and the performances are compared.
For the MC method, the prior probability for unknown and
unforeseen events are set to a very small nonzero probability
of δ = e−20 (Laplace-smoothing) when training a model XT
for observation sequences of length T . For MC, the probability
of transitioning to an observation state oj depends only on the
probability of the last observation state oi, i.e.
τi,j = Prob(XT = oj |XT−1 = oi). (5)
If the prior probability of entering any state i is pi =
Prob{X0 = i} with respect to the set of observations for user-
z OzT , then the total probability of traversing any sequence of
n consecutive observations i0, . . . , in ∈ OzT is calculated as
Prob(X0 = i0, . . . , Xn = in) = pi0τi0,i1 . . . τin−1,in (6)
Similar to the MC method, in HMM-lap method Laplacian
Smoothing of the emission probabilities is considered with
HMM to incorporate unforeseen observations as discussed in
[22]. The number of hidden states is fixed to 20 for all the
experiments and the maximum number of iteration is set to
50.
The most suitable approach for handling unforeseen obser-
vations is the Marginally Smoothed Hidden Markov Model
(MSHMM) introduced in [22]. To adopt the approach for the
active authentication problem, the marginal probabilities of the
presence of an application in the training sequence of a user
for each time-zone and day flags are precomputed. Assuming
that the probability of user-x using application aix at time-zone
TZ(t) at time t, P (aix, Tj) is independent of the probability
of user-x using the application at location W (t), P (aix,W (t))
at time t, the emission probability from state s to observation
ot, ês(ot) is P (O
{ax,TZ(t),W (t)}
t = o
{ax,TZ(t),W (t)}
t |Xt = s)
if ot ∈ O{a
p
x,TZ(t),W (t)}
t . Otherwise,
ês(ot) = P (O
{ax,TZ(t)}
t = o
{ax,TZ(t)}|Xt = s)×
P (O
{apx,W (t)}
t = o
{ax,W (t)}
t |Xt = s), (7)
where P (o{ax,TZ(t)}t = max(δ, P (ax, TZ(t))) and,
P (o
{ax,W (t)}
t = max(δ, P (ax,W (t))). By definition,
the MSHMM approach is capable of differentiating between
unknown applications and unforeseen observations with
known applications, as well as, the more frequent vs. less
frequent applications occurring at different time zones and
days.
In the next section, experimental results for these three
verification methods are discussed in detail for performance
comparison.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The performances of M-ED, MMC, HMM-lap and
MSHMM algorithms for the full test sequences of the
UMDAA-02 application usage dataset are shown in Table VI,
Fig. 7. Average change in MSHMM scores in response to intrusion on the
UMDAA-02 application-usage data.
where, the sampling rate has been varied from one sample
every 5 seconds to one sample every 30 seconds with intervals
of 5 seconds, while the number of previous observations n is
varied from 20 to 60 with intervals of 10. It can be seen from
the table that with smaller sampling rate and bigger n, the EER
drops for all the methods. The MSHMM outperforms every
other method in every case, which can be attributed to the
improved modeling capability of the method due to marginal
smoothing. For a practical verification system, the sampling
rate and value of n would determine the latency of decision
making. In many cases, a sample every 30 second might be
too late and therefore the system designer should choose these
parameters carefully.
As for n, intuitively with more historical data the perfor-
mance should improve all the time. In order to determine
the impact of n and also to get an idea about the latency
of MSHMM when intrusion occurs, a different experiment
was performed where a different user’s data is appended
with the legitimate user’s data to simulate intrusion. To be
more precise, for each user of the UMDAA-02 dataset, 200
consecutive observations from the test sequence starting from a
random index are appended with 200 consecutive observations
from the test sequences of all the other users (start index
picked randomly) and the whole sequence is evaluated using
MSHMM for different n values. The average score values
across all users are plotted in Fig. 7 for different n values.
When the observations from a different user starts to enter
a batch (at 200-th batch), the average scores returned by
MSHMM for each batch drops vividly, as can be seen from
the figure. Also, the figure clearly shows the drop is larger for
large n values - proving the intuition that considering more
historical data is advantageous in this regard. As for latency,
if the score of −200 is considered as a threshold for decision
making, then for all n = 60, the intrusion will be detected
within ∼ 5 batches, i.e. withing 2.5 minutes from the inception
of intrusion.
TABLE VI
APPLICATION-USAGE-BASED VERIFICATION PERFORMANCE COMPARISON FOR UMDAA-02 DATASET ACROSS DIFFERENT METHODS BASED ON EER
(%) FOR VARYING SEQUENCE LENGTH (N) AND SAMPLING RATE. THE NUMBER OF HIDDEN STATES IS FIXED AT 20 AND MAXIMUM NUMBER OF
ITERATION IS 50 FOR HMM-BASED METHODS.
n Method
Sampling Rate
1/5 1/10 1/15 1/20 1/25 1/30
20
M-ED 42.96 42.92 44.12 43.64 43.09 43.2
MMC 40.86 40.53 40.27 39.48 40.39 36.78
HMM-lap 38.49 38.35 37.82 37.39 38.83 36.77
MSHMM 37.3 37.3 36.67 35.93 35.63 34.82
30
M-ED 42.7 41.71 40.18 38.17 37.58 39.03
MMC 40.29 39.18 38.21 40 39.04 36.82
HMM-lap 37.28 37.2 36.68 37.73 37.89 37.45
MSHMM 36.23 36.87 35.74 36.87 35.99 35.79
40
M-ED 41.7 38.64 38.41 38.13 37.45 36.97
MMC 39.29 40.57 38.13 39.62 41.97 35.89
HMM-lap 37.37 37.88 36.75 36.07 39.11 34.62
MSHMM 35.4 35.65 34.026 34.4 36.58 32.54
50
M-ED 40.69 37.98 36.19 35.55 35.58 35.53
MMC 40.34 37.92 38.67 36.96 39.57 33.56
HMM-lap 36.97 36.01 36.48 34.72 36.7 33.95
MSHMM 35.95 34.41 34.67 32.41 35.27 30
60
M-ED 38.69 35.93 35.32 35.72 34.97 34.31
MMC 38.33 37.5 37.5 38.01 35.91 34.35
HMM-lap 35.31 35.48 34.18 33.15 36.05 34.35
MSHMM 34.036 34.92 32.78 33.33 34.3 31.93
Finally, for the Securacy dataset, the performances of
MSHMM, HMM-lap, MMC and M-ED are presented in Table.
VII. Similar to the UMDAA-02 dataset results, MSHMM
outperforms the other methods by a good margin. Note that the
EER values are much lower for this dataset for the state-space
models, which is understandable since it has already been
demonstrated in Fig. 3(c) that the users are quite separable
in this dataset even if only application names are considered.
However, M-ED faces difficulty in exploiting the separability
of the observations since is not capable of modeling temporal
variations as effectively as state-space models.
TABLE VII
APP-BASED VERIFICATION EER(%) COMPARISON FOR SECURACY
DATASET ACROSS DIFFERENT METHODS [22] FOR DIFFERENT n VALUES.
NUMBER OF HIDDEN STATES IS SET TO 20 AND SAMPLING RATE IS
1/30s−1 .
n MSHMM MMC HMM-lap M-ED
20 17.23 19.286 19.66 35.09
30 16.75 18.9967 19.59 32.88
40 16.38 18.7074 19.19 31.4
50 16.26 17.9475 19.22 30.53
60 16.16 17.6443 18.38 30.58
Based on results of the experiments presented in this paper,
it can be asserted that application-usage data might be useful as
a soft biometric for user verification for bolstering the decision
in a multi-modal authentication scenario. Given the fact that
the application-usage data is readily available and easy to track
without using much battery or computational power, real-time
score generation is possible. The experiments also depict that
the verification scores show rapid change for intrusion within
several minutes. Hence, the latency is not too high for a soft
biometric measure. However, even though state-space models
can be made to work well with some modifications, the equal
error rate for a diverse dataset is still around ∼ 16%, which
needs further improvement. In this regard, bigger training
datasets and keeping longer usage history might be helpful. In
addition, if computational constraints can be loosened, then
more sophisticated high-performance methods such as deep
neural networks can be employed to minimize the EER.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the challenging problem of active authen-
tication using application usage data has been formulated
and systematically tackled to obtain viable solutions. Through
several experiments, the impact of unknown applications and
unforeseen observations on the authentication problem has
been investigated and it is established that for this problem
inclusion of the uncertain events are necessary to obtain
better performances. In this regard, a modified edit distance
algorithm has been introduced, the performance of which
is compared with three state-space models namely, Markov
Chain, HMM with Laplacian Smoothing and Marginally-
Smoothed HMM, in terms of EER. Experiments were per-
formed on the UMDAA-02 and the Securacy application-
usage datasets. The experiments revealed some very interesting
insights about the differences between the two datasets. Also,
the paper addressed different aspects of important practical
considerations such as intrusion detection, latency, observation
history and sampling rate. As for future work, the M-ED
method might be further improved by varying the distances for
the three different cases based on the marginal probabilities.
Also, recurrent neural network (RNN)-based models might be
able to learn more discriminative properties of application-
usage patterns. However, RNNs require huge amount of data
for useful training, which the two datasets presented here
lacks. Another interesting research direction would be the joint
training of application sequence and some other sequential
data such as the location data to improve the authentica-
tion performance. Finally, since application information are
also suitable context for other modalities, application data
sequences can have duel utilization (as a separate modality
and also as context) in more advanced active authentication
schemes.
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